

WEB APPENDIX
‘The Importance of Losses and Gains in Welfare State Reform’,
Journal of European Social Policy, 19(5)

Appendix A
Expanded References

This list supplements the citations in the text and follow the order in which the abbreviated references appear in the text. Please find the full references at the end of this web appendix, in Appendix D.

On the impact of socio-economic changes on welfare state development, see also:

Cameron (1978), Katzenstein (1985), Kapstein (1996), Strange (1996), Garrett (1998), Rodrik (1997, 1998), Kitschelt et al. (1999), Iversen and Cusack (2000), Burgoon (2001), Garrett and Mitchell (2001), Adserà and Boix (2002), Swank (2002), Mosley (2003), Koster (2007), Ha (2008).

On the development of NSR policies, see also:

Huber and Stephens (2006), Keman, Van Kersbergen and Vis (2006).

On the political economy of reforms, see also:

Alesina and Drazen (1991), Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Drazen and Grilli (1993), Cuckierman and Tommasi (1998), Hsieh (2000), Drazen and Easterly (2001), Spolaore (2004), Alesina et al. (2006).

On timing in political processes, see also:

Bridges (2000), Jervis (2000), Pierson (2000a, 2000b), Thelen (2000).

On the influence of ideas and learning in (welfare state) reform, see also:


Hall (1993), Visser and Hemerijck (1997), Blyth (2002), Schmidt (2002), Béland (2005), Taylor-Gooby (2005), Stiller (2007), Fleckenstein (2008).

On the applicability of prospect theory in collective decision-making, see also:

Bowman (1980), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), McDermott (1998), Weyland (2002) and Fuhrman and Early (2008).

Appendix B Tables and figures

Figure 1 The pattern of reform



Note: Based on the fuzzy-set scores for Activation and Benefit Cutbacks in Table 4 in main text. Cases above the yellow line display activation or benefit cutbacks.

Table A1 Features of governments

	<i>Govern. party/ies</i> (% votes)	<i>Main opp. party</i> (% votes)	<i>Average economic</i> <i>growth</i>	<i>Average</i> <i>unemployment</i>	<i>WPP</i>	<i>WSE</i>	<i>RIGHT</i>
Schlüter I	Cons (14.5) Agr. Lib (11.3) Centre Dem (8.3) CPP (2.3)	SD (32.9)	2.8% (almost stable)	8.2% (decreasing)	.33	.33	1.00
Schlüter II	Cons (23.4) Agr. Lib (12.1) Centre Dem (4.6) CPP (2.7)	SD (31.6)	4.4% (almost stable)	5.5% (decreasing after 1985; then stable)	.33	.60	1.00
Schlüter IV	Cons (19.3) Agr. Lib (11.8) Rad. Lib (5.6)	SD (29.8)	1.7% (3.6/.3/1.2)	6.6% (increasing)	.33	.67	1.00
Schlüter V	Cons (16.0) Agr. Lib (15.8)	SD (37.4)	.9% (decreasing)	8.3% (increasing)	.60	.67	1.00
N.Rasm. I	SD (40.6) Centre Dem (4.6) Social Lib (4.6) CPP (3.2)	Cons (16.0) Agr. Lib (15.8)	2.8% (increasing from 0 to 5.5)	8.7% (decreasing)	.17	.17	.40
N.Rasm. II (& III)	SD (34.6) Social Lib (4.6) Centre Dem (2.8)	Agr. Lib (23.3)	2.8% (almost stable)	6.1% (decreasing)	.40	.60	.25

Contd/

Table A1 continued

	Govern. party/ies (% votes)	Main opp. party (% votes)	Average economic growth	Average unemployment	WPP	WSE	RIGHT
N.Rasm. IV	SD (35.9) Social Lib (3.9)	Agr. Lib (24.0)	2.6% (almost stable)	4.7% (almost stable)	.33	.33	.25
Kohl I	CD (48.8) Con. Lib (7.0)	SD (38.2)	2.2% (almost stable)	6.9% (almost stable)	.17	.33	1.00
Kohl II	CD (44.3) Con. Lib (9.1)	SD (37.0)	3.6% (increasing from 1.5 to 5.7)	5.7% (decreasing from 6.3 to 4.8)	.33	.17	1.00
Kohl III	CD (43.8) Con. Lib (11.0)	SD (33.5)	2.1% (5/2./ -1.1/2.3)	6.8% (increasing from 5.3 to 8.0)	.33	.33	1.00
Kohl IV	CD (41.5) Con. Lib (6.9)	SD (36.4)	1.4% (almost stable: 1.7/ .8/1.4/1.7)	8.5% (increasing from 7.7 to 8.7, with 9.2 in 1987)	.67	.67	1.00
Schröder I	SD (40.9) Greens (6.7)	CD (35.1)	1.5% (1.9/3.1/1/.1)	7.8% (about stable)	.33	.40	0
Lubbers I	CD (29.4) Con. Lib (23.1)	SD (30.4)	1.7% (increasing from -1.2 to 3.1)	9.5% (increasing between 1982-3 from 8.2 to 10.6; then 10.2 and decreasing to 8.8)	.33	.83	1.00
Lubbers II	CD (34.6) Con. Lib. (17.4)	SD (33.3)	2.9% (2.8/1.4/2.6/4.7)	7.4% (decreasing from 8 tot 6.6)	.17	.33	1.00

Contd/

Table A1 continued

	<i>Govern. party/ies (% votes)</i>	<i>Main opp. party (% votes)</i>	<i>Average economic growth</i>	<i>Average unemployment</i>	<i>WPP</i>	<i>WSE</i>	<i>RIGHT</i>
Lubbers III	CD (35.3) SD (31.9)	Con. Lib (16.4)	2.3% (decreasing from 4.1 to .8)	5.6% (almost stable)	.33	.67	.60
Kok I	SD (24) Con. Lib (20) Prog. Lib (15)	CD (22.2)	3.1% (almost stable)	6.4% (decreasing from 7.2 to 5.4, increasing from 1992 onwards)	.17	.40	.40
Kok II	SD (29) Con. Lib (25) Prog. Lib (9)	CD (18.4)	3.3% (almost stable; decreasing from 3.5 to 1.2 between 2000-1)	3.3% (decreasing from 4.2 to 2.5)	.33	.33	.40
Thatcher I	Cons (43.9)	Lab. (36.9)	.3% (growth rates positive in 1979 [2.8%], but declining to -2.2 in 1980; positive in 1982 [1.7])	7.2% (increasing throughout the period)	.17	.83	1.00
Thatcher II	Cons (42.4)	Lab. (27.6)	3.5% (increasing from 2.2 to 4.4)	11.2% (high, but stable)	.33	.33	1.00
Thatcher III	Cons (42.3)	Lab. (30.8)	2.2% (after 1988 [5.2], the growth rate falls: 2.1/.7/-1.5)	7.3% (decreasing from 1986 onwards; in- creasing from 1990 onwards)	.33	.67	1.00
Major I	Cons (41.9)	Lab. (34.4)	2.4% (in 1991, 1; then increasing to 2.3 in 1993 and further)	9.3% (decreasing from 9.8 to 8.0)	.33	.60	1.00

Contd/

Table A1 continued

	<i>Govern. party/ies</i> (% votes)	<i>Main opp. party</i> (% votes)	<i>Average economic</i> <i>growth</i>	<i>Average</i> <i>unemployment</i>	<i>WPP</i>	<i>WSE</i>	<i>RIGHT</i>
Blair I	Lab. (42.3)	Cons. (30.7)	3.3% (almost stable; decreasing to 2.1 in 2001)	6.2% (decreasing from 7.0 to 5.1)	.17	.33	0
Blair II	Lab. (40.7)	Cons. (31.7)	2.7% (increasing from 2.1 to 3.3)	5.0% (almost stable)	.33	.33	0

Notes and sources: **Cons** is Conservatives; **Agr. Lib** is Agrarian Liberals; **Dem** is Democrats; **CPP** is Christian People's Party; **SD** is Social Democrats; **Rad Lib** is Radical Liberals; **CD** is Christian Democrats; **Con. Lib** is Conservative Liberals; **Prog. Lib** is Progressive Liberals; **Government party/ies/main opp. party (% votes)** is the percentage of votes collected by the government party/ies/largest opposition party (Woldendorp et al., 2000; Armingeon et al., 2008, from 2003 onwards data collected by author from various sources); **Average economic growth** per cabinet period, with economic growth measured as the percentage change in real gross domestic product per year (Armingeon et al., 2008; from 2003 onwards OECD, 2006); **Average unemployment** per cabinet period, commonly used definitions (Armingeon et al. 2008; from 2003 onwards: OECD, 2006); **WSE** and **WPP**, see main text.

Table A2 Truth table for Activation and Benefit Cutbacks

<i>Conditions</i>			<i>Activation</i>				<i>Benefit Cutbacks</i>			
<i>WPP</i>	<i>WSE</i>	<i>RIGHT</i>	Outcome	Cons.	N	Cabinets	Outcome	Cons.	N	Cabinets
			ACT				BEN			
0	1	0	1	.98	1	Nyrup Rasmussen II	1	.98	1	Nyrup Rasmussen II
0	0	1	1	.89	6	Schlüter I, Lubbers II, Kohl I & II, Thatcher II [Kohl III]	1	.88	6	Schlüter I, Thatcher II, Kohl II & III, [Kohl I, Lubbers II]
0	0	0	1	.88	7	Kok I-II, Nyrup Rasmussen I & IV, Blair I, [Schröder I, Blair II]	0	.78	7	Kok II, Schröder I, Nyrup Rasmussen I, Blair II [Kok I, Nyrup Rasmussen IV, Blair I]
1	1	1	0	.81	2	Kohl IV, [Schlüter V]	1	.97	2	Schlüter V, Kohl IV
0	1	1	0	.79	7	Schlüter II, Thatcher I & III, Major I, Lubbers I [Lubbers III, Schlüter IV]	1	.94	7	Lubbers I & III, Schlüter II & IV, Thatcher I & III, Major I
1	0	0	-		0		-		0	
1	0	1	-		0		-		0	
1	1	0	-		0		-		0	

Notes: The cut-off point for Activation is .88 because of the drop in consistency from .88 to .76 (Ragin, 2008: 135). For Benefit Cutbacks it is .88 because of the drop in consistency from .88 to .78. **WPP** is Weak Political Position; **WSE** is Weak Socio-Economic Situation; **RIGHT** is Rightist governments; **Outcome ACT** is the outcome for Activation; **Cons.** is consistency; **Number** is the number of cabinets with membership higher than .5; **Cabinets** lists these cabinets, with those cabinets where a specific configuration of causal conditions produced a deviant outcome presented between brackets; **Outcome BEN** is the outcome for Benefit Cutbacks; - indicates logical remainders, i.e. configurations without empirical cases.

Appendix C

Coding of the Political Position of the British, Danish, Dutch, and German Cabinets, 1979-2005 ¹

British cabinets

Thatcher I (May 1979-June 1983)

The Thatcher I cabinet is coded as having a very strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .83). The position was so strong because the 1979 election saw ‘(...) the Conservatives return to power with the largest parliamentary majority since 1966 and also the largest lead in the popular vote attained by any party since 1945’ (Berrington, 1983: 263). In its first year in office, the government became highly unpopular though. Its cuts in taxes could not offset the increase in unemployment that resulted from the retrenchment of public expenditure. However, and good for the cabinet’s political position, Labour was also highly unpopular because of its shift to the left. The newly formed Alliance of the Social Democratic Party and the Liberals, conversely, did gain support after its erection in September 1981. Polling over 50 per cent over the votes in November 1981, there were even talks about a next Alliance government – especially as the two major parties did so poorly. Alliance’s support dropped somewhat early 1982, but remained at about 30 per cent (Berrington, 1983: 263).

Everything changed for the government’s popularity when Argentina seized the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982. After some heated debate, the government sent a task force to recapture the islands. In June 1982, the Argentine troops surrendered. A month later, the Prime Minister who had a year before been called ‘the most unpopular PM [Prime Minister] since the polls began’, started to dominate the political landscape. The Conservatives polled around 46 per cent of the votes and even 52 per cent of the voters approved of Thatcher as PM (Berrington, 1983: 264).

Thatcher II (June 1983-June 1987)

The Thatcher II cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). In the run up to the 1983 election, the government had a comfortable campaign because they were ahead in the polls by a size almost unknown to a governing party (Berrington, 1983: 264). The Conservatives were able to reap an extra 3.9 per cent of the votes. The Alliance won 11.6 per cent of the vote – the highest share for a Liberal party since 1923 (Berrington 1983: 265). Thatcher and her government thus returned to power with a substantially larger majority (Cozens and Swaddle, 1987: 263).

¹ Information on the elections is taken from *Electoral Studies*’ ‘Notes on Recent Elections’ and from the *European Journal of Political Research*’ ‘Political Data’ (from 1991 onwards). The percentage of votes for the governing party or parties and for the main opposition party or parties can be found in Table A1.

Thatcher III (June 1987-April 1992)

Also the Thatcher III cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). The general election of June 11 1987 brought Thatcher back into power with an overall majority of 102 seats, which is somewhat below the landslide victory of 144 seats in 1983 (Cozens and Swaddle, 1987: 263). In terms of the percentage of votes, the government had lost just .1 per cent.

Since June 1989, Labour enjoyed a large leap in the opinion polls. This position changed abruptly because of Thatcher's deposition. In the next four months, Major enjoyed a honeymoon period and this, in combination with the war in Iraq, resulted in the Conservatives leading solidly in the polls. After these months, in which the support was over 50 per cent, support declined and never topped 40 per cent. The war in Iraq caused internal division within the Labour party (Mackie, 1992: 538-9).

Major I (April 1992-May 1997)

The Major I cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). Against the predictions of the pre-election opinion polls, and even the exit polls, the Conservatives won the 1992 election with a working majority (Mortimore, 1992: 352). It has been argued that the victory of Major '(...)' depended on successfully disassociating his government from its former leader, Margaret Thatcher, who by the time of her deposition had become an electoral liability (...)' (Mortimore, 1992: 355). The year 1993 proved a difficult one for the government, with support for the ministry and the Prime Minister dropping to record lows (by late 1993/early 1994, only 13% approved the government's performance), and with local government elections and by-elections bringing further setbacks (Mackie, 1994: 446ff).

The year 1996, the pre-election year, proved to be not very successful for the Conservative government. The relationship between the UK and Europe was a topic of debate. In March, the BSE crisis got a grip on the UK and other European countries. The consensus was that the government had coped with this crisis miserably. Then there were problems concerning corruption and maladministration and the fact that the main opposition party, (New) Labour, seemed to have erected from the ashes and had improved its prospects of forming the new government (Webb, 1997: 511ff). The declining support for the Conservatives in the polls is traceable back to 1992, when the UK was forced to leave the European Exchange Rate Mechanism; this turned a 7 per cent lead in the polls into a 20 per cent loss (Wood, 1999: 143).

Blair I (May 1997-June 2001)

The Blair I cabinet is coded as having a very strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score of .83). Labour won an absolute majority of 179 seats; the Conservatives scored the second lowest result ever (165) and the lowest share in the popular vote (30.7%). The Liberal Democrats, conversely, won the highest number of seats (46) since 1929 (Wood, 1999: 146-147).

Labour's good political fortune of the recent years continued in 1998. The average

opinion polls throughout the year was 52 per cent (never dipping below 51%), whereas the Conservatives polled only 28 per cent (never surpassing 29%). Blair was highly popular. Between 62 and 72 per cent of the voters expressed their satisfaction (Webb, 1999: 533). There were, however, some small intra-party tensions in 1998. One issue concerned certain aspects of the 1997 welfare reform, which remained one of the government's thorniest issues (Webb, 1999: 533-4).

Throughout 1999, Labour's good standing with the electorate continued (Webb, 2000: 547). Regarding the proposed welfare reform, intra-party disagreement continued, which among other things was visible in rebellions of backbenchers. In 1999, the problems within the Conservative party regarding issues such as leadership and policies continued (Webb, 2000).

Blair II (June 2002-May 2005)

The Blair II cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). The result of the 2001 election was similar to the 1997 one: a major victory for Labour, receiving its second historic landslide despite losing six seats (minus 1.6% of the votes). The Conservatives won one seat only (Fisher, 2002: 1101; see also Bartle, 2003).

Despite its victory, Labour had a difficult 2002, which was mainly caused by the dissatisfaction with – and the government's plans for – public services, a topic that dominated the political debate that year (see Fisher, 2003: 1110ff). Dissatisfactions involved particularly the quality and level of services and the government's proposals for reform. This resulted in two cabinet reshuffles within five months time. Furthermore, the 2001/2002 parliamentary sessions saw more rebellions (76) by Labour Members of Parliament than during any previous Labour government (Fisher, 2003: 1108). These problems were reflected in the polls; popularity dropped from 48 per cent in January to 39 per cent in December 2002. The Liberal Democrats were the main beneficiaries of this, as the Conservatives could not capitalize on Labour's problems. The satisfaction ratings of the government fell accordingly, as did those of Blair (Fisher, 2003: 1108-9).

In 2004, Labour, and especially Blair, started with the lowest polls in over a decade. In January, Labour polled 38 per cent, the Conservatives 36, and the Liberal Democrats 20 (Fisher and Smith, 2005: 1217). The year proved a tough one for Blair with the Hutton report, internal power struggles (should/would Brown replace Blair?), and so forth. At the end of the year, the Conservatives' position in the polls had dropped (to 32%), whereas Labour had remained at 37 per cent (and the Liberal Democrats had increased to 22%) (Fisher and Smith, 2005: 1219).

Danish cabinets

Schlüter I (Sept. 1982-Oct. 1984)

The Schlüter I cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). This government replaced the previous Social Democratic minority government, without elections being held. The mood was generally optimistic and favourable towards the coalition. Upon taking office, the cabinet held 36.4 per cent of the votes (vis-à-vis

32.9% for the main opposition party, the Social Democrats); by the time the 1984 election was announced in December 1983, government support had grown to 45 per cent (Borre, 1984: 190).

Schlüter II (Oct. 1984-Sept. 1987)

Also the Schlüter II cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). The coalition capitalized on the grown support and won the 1984 election by increasing its share of the votes to 42.8 per cent. Especially Schlüter's Conservative People Party won substantially (plus 8.9%). Still, the cabinet's position was not very strong as its main rival's losses had been only modest (minus .5%) (Borre, 1984: 191).

Schlüter IV (May 1988-Dec. 1990)²

Like the other two Schlüter cabinets, the fourth one is also coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). Between 1982 and 1988, the Schlüter coalitions had consisted of the Conservatives, Agrarians, Centre Democrats, and the Christian People's Party, relying on the support of the centrist Radical Liberals. For attaining a majority, the governments needed either the Social Democrats on the left or the Progress Party on the right. At times, an alternative majority had over-ruled the government, for example in foreign issue matters. This had become intolerable in May 1988, when 'the Radical Liberals, so to speak, forced their way into the government at the cost of the Centre Democrats and the Christian People's party' (Borre, 1991: 133). As a result, the cabinet held 36.7 per cent of the votes against 29.8 per cent for the Social Democrats – still the coalition's main rival.

Schlüter V (Dec. 1990-Jan. 1993)

The Schlüter V cabinet is coded as having a more or less weak Political Position (fuzzy-set score .4). The Social Democrats and the Agrarian Liberals emerged as winners in the 1990 election, gaining respectively 7.6 and 4.0 per cent of the votes (Borre, 1991: 134-136). Because of the electoral defeat in December 1990 (minus 2.1% of the votes), the Radical Liberals withdrew from the tripartite minority government. The support in parliament for the new coalition, consisting of the Conservatives and the Liberals was minimal, especially as no other parties had committed themselves to government support. To survive, the coalition needed support from all parties on the right of the Social Democrats or from the Social Democrats itself (Bille, 1992: 387-8).

Nyrup Rasmussen I (Jan. 1993-Sept. 1994)

The Nyrup Rasmussen I cabinet is coded as having a strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .83). This cabinet resulted after Prime Minister (PM) Schlüter announced the resig-

² Schlüter III is not included because it was in office less than a year.

nation of his cabinet on January 14 1993, because of the so-called Tamil Gate affair.³ It was very unusual that the PM did not call a general election before resigning – this happened only twice before: in 1950 and in 1982 (Bille, 1994: 282-3).

After only 11 days, the largest cabinet ever was installed.⁴ For Danish politics highly unusual, this government held a majority of the votes; it was the first majority cabinet since 1971 and only the fourth one since 1945. With the instalment of the cabinet, a change of power took place: from rightist (bourgeois) to Social Democratic. Interestingly, this was not the outcome of a general election, but resulted from the decision of the centre parties to change sides after more than a decade of supporting centre-right and right-wing governments. Additionally, it was remarkable that the Centre Democrats and the Christian Democratic Party joined the Social Democratic government, given that the former parties were usually regarded right-wing ones.

Despite their unease with the new coalition and the fact that it had been erected without general elections, the opposition from the Liberals and the Conservatives was relatively modest. As the referendum regarding the Maastricht Treaty and the Edinburgh Agreement was an important topic during spring, the *yes*-parties had to put their disagreements on hold for the moment in order to secure a majority in favour of their position.

*Nyrup Rasmussen II (& III) (Sept. 1994-March 1998)*⁵

The Nyrup Rasmussen II (& III) cabinet is coded as having a more or less weak Political Position (fuzzy-set score .4). Since 1945, none of the four majority governments was voted back into office and this neither happened this time. The Social Democrats lost 6 per cent of the votes, the Centre Democrats survived but lost 1.8 per cent of the votes, and the Christian Democrats did not pass the election threshold (for the first time since 1973). In fact, of the incumbent parties, only the Social Liberals won (1 seat). The clear winners were the Liberals, gaining 7.5 per cent of the votes, and the Unity List that for the first time passed threshold and gained 3.1 per cent of the votes. The other parties in opposition lost mildly (Bille, 1995: 320). The loss of the government parties is remarkable given the increasing growth rates and the reforms implemented (a tax reform and a labour market reform to tackle unemployment, Thomsen, 1995: 315-316). Government formation was quite simple. Although the Socialist People's Party and the Unity List indicated that they would not want to participate in a three-party minority government, they would not submit a vote of no confidence either (Bille, 1995: 320). As usual with the Danish minority governments, the cabinet was back to a situation in which it had to form a majority on important issues in parliament.

Although the cabinet had clearly lost votes, seats, and even a party, it was uncertain how much the government had lost in terms of power. Despite the gains for the Liberals,

³ The Tamil Gate affair involved the court of inquiry's conclusion that the administration of a law granting refugees the right to be reunited with their families in Denmark was illegal. The information that the PM had given in regards this affair was considered 'highly misleading' and 'directly incorrect'.

⁴ The following draws on Bille (1994: 284-285).

⁵ Nyrup Rasmussen III is included as Nyrup Rasmussen II because the former began when the Centre Democrats left the coalition.

the right-wing alliance had not managed to gain a majority of seats in parliament (Thomsen, 1995: 322).

Nyrup Rasmussen IV (March 1998-Nov. 2001)

The Nyrup Rasmussen IV cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). The 1998 election was basically a status quo election (Bille, 1999: 377). The Social Democratic/Social Liberals minority government stayed in office. The Unity List, the Socialist People's Party, and one North Atlantic seat supported the cabinet. This constituted a fragile majority of one seat. Still, the government's position was less feeble than it may have seemed, as the opposition on the right had been weakened, which was due to the substantially varying stances of the six parties from extreme right to centre (Bille, 1999: 378; see also Elklit, 1999: 141). Hence, Bille's (1999: 380) conclusion that 'despite its tiny parliamentary basis, the position of the minority government was not weak, since it had room for political manoeuvre, playing one side [the parties on the left] off against the other [the parties on the right]'. The strength of the cabinet was demonstrated by the major tax reform enacted as well as by the reform of the pension system. As the latter went against the explicit promises of the Social Democrats during the election campaign, backlash occurred. Social Democratic party members, trade union members and voters protested, leading to a crisis within the Social Democratic party in early 1999. Party members left the party, donations from trade union members stalled, and the party's support measured by opinion polls dropped to about 20 per cent – the lowest level ever (Bille, 1999: 380).

The Social Democrats worked extremely hard to explain to their constituencies the necessity of the changes in the early retirement scheme. The effort worked to a certain extent. Although still 5 to 10 per cent lower than the result of the 1998 election, the support for the Social Democrats increased from the 20 per cent low (Bille, 2000: 368). The Conservatives, conversely, were unable to manage their internal rifts. Also in the Progress Party, restoring peace proved impossible (see Bille, 1999: 368ff).

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001, the government strongly supported the measures taken by NATO and the European Union to counter terrorism – something that all parties (except the leftist Unity List) supported. Also the Prime Minister benefited in terms of popularity from his firm and well balanced handling of the situation. The Social Democrats started to rise in the polls again, reaching 30 per cent. This might have been one of the reasons why Nyrup Rasmussen decided on 31 October 2001 that the election was to take place on 20 November – the same day of the municipal and county elections (Bille, 2002: 941-942).

Dutch cabinets

Lubbers I (Sept. 1982-May 1986)

The Lubbers I cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). In the 1982 election, the Conservative Liberals entered the coalition after having won 5.8 per cent of the votes. The position was not very strong, though, since the other

coalition partner, the Christian Democrats had incurred a 1.5 per cent loss of the votes and was no longer the largest party in the Netherlands – a position taken over by the Social Democrats (see Irwin, 1983). Still, both the Christian Democrats and the Conservative Liberals did well in the polls in their first year in office. By fall 1983, both parties started losing votes to the Social Democrats, which polled even 40 per cent of the votes at the end of 1984 – a historic high. By mid-1985, the popularity of the Christian Democrats started to rise again, against a slightly dropping popularity of the Social Democrats (Van der Eijk, Irwin and Niemöller, 1986). Furthermore, public opinion polls demonstrated that the voters of all parties considered Lubbers to be a good Prime Minister (Van der Eijk et al., 1986: 295).

Lubbers II (May 1986-Sept. 1989)

The Lubbers II cabinet is coded as having a very strong Political Position (a fuzzy-set score of .83). Before the 1986 election, the Christian Democrats announced that they would like to continue the coalition with the Conservative Liberals – an exceptional move in Dutch politics. Prior to the election, only 36 per cent of the voters indicated that they thought the coalition would lose its majority (Van der Eijk et al., 1986: 291). Nonetheless, it came as surprise that the Christian Democrats were very successful in the election (plus 5.2 per cent of the votes). The other coalition partner, conversely, lost 5.7 per cent of the votes, which left unchanged the majority of the coalition (Van der Eijk et al., 1986).

Lubbers III (Sept. 1989-May 1994)

The Lubbers III cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). Together, the coalition parties received 67.2 per cent of the votes – a very large majority for a Dutch cabinet. Lubbers I and II, for example, received about 52 per cent of the votes. However, there are also indications that this cabinet's political position was not excellent. So, the Social Democrats – the Christian Democrats' new coalition partner – started to drop in the polls from the beginning of 1990 onwards; a deteriorating position that expressed itself in the poor performance in the municipal elections of 21 March 1990. The position of the Christian Democrats also weakened during the term in office. In 1991, when the problems regarding the restructuring of the disability pensions (WAO) started to rise, the party's support slipped below the 30 per cent level. The downward trend continued until the fall of 1993 and plummeted thereafter. The winners in this process were the two liberal parties (VVD and D66) (Irwin, 1995).

Kok I (May 1994-May 1998)

The Kok I cabinet is coded as having a very strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .83). This score is mainly based on the major success of two of the three governing parties: the Conservative Liberals who gained 5.4 per cent of the votes, and the Progressive Liberals who gained 7.6 per cent of the votes. The third coalition party, the Social Democrats, lost 7.9 per cent of the votes. This result, however, could be seen as somewhat of a victory as the polls three months before the elections had pointed to a loss of about 13 per cent

(Irwin 1995: 75). The Christian Democrats, the opposition party, incurred the most severe loss: minus 13.1 per cent of the votes. Furthermore, the political position of Kok I weakened in 1997 by two quasi-crises: an epidemic hitting Dutch pigs (*varkenspest*) in February and the failure of two ministers from the Progressive Liberal party (Hans van Mierlo of Foreign Affairs and Winnie Sorgdrager of Justice) to arrest a suspected drugs dealer (Lucardie and Voerman, 1998: 472).⁶

Generally speaking, though, the Kok I coalition encountered few problems. When the 1998 election approached, public opinion polls indicated that it were especially the Social Democrats and Conservative Liberals who profited from the high levels of satisfaction among the voters. Furthermore, the Social Democratic Prime Minister Kok was popular, also among the liberal voters. As the Christian Democrats were newcomers in the opposition benches, their counterweight to the cabinet had been weak at times (Irwin, 1999).

Kok II (May 1998-May 2002)

The Kok II is also coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). As polled before the elections, the Social Democrats and the Conservative Liberals were the main winners in the 1998 election: plus 5 per cent of the votes. The Progressive Liberals, conversely, lost 5 per cent of the votes. Like with the Social Democrats in the previous election, this could be considered somewhat of a positive outcome as the polls indicated much heavier losses (Irwin, 1999).

German cabinets

Kohl I (March 1983-Jan. 1987)

The Kohl I cabinet is coded as having a strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score of .83).⁷ Throughout 1982, public opinion data indicated that the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) were on the verge of an absolute majority. The Social Democrats (SPD) and the Conservative Liberals (FDP), conversely, were losing ground. In this period, the support for Chancellor Schmidt (SPD) was steadily declining and a new party of Greens was formed. From March 1983 to the end of 1984, Kohl I was in its honeymoon period and continuously headed the SPD in the polls. From early 1985 to mid-1986, the government's position declined, as the SPD recovered and the Greens turned the tides. The satisfaction with the coalition dropped not so much because of the deteriorating economic situation – even though unemployment kept rising –, but because of a series of scandals. The most serious one was the allegation that the Flick conglomerate had paid large sums of money to the CDU and FDP for political favours. Because of these charges, the CDU Speaker of the Bundestag, Rainer Barzel, and the FDP Minister of Economics, Count Lamsdorff, resigned (Pulzer, 1987: 150). From mid-1986 onwards, the SPD's popularity dropped. Whereas in May 1986 the majority of voters still expected a SPD-Greens major-

⁶ The suspected drugs dealer, Desi Bouterse, was an ex-commander of the armed forces in Surinam (a former Dutch colony), leader of the Surinam National Democratic Party, and advisor to the government.

⁷ The following draws on Kaase (1983).

ity, only a quarter did by the end of the year. In December, the CDU even polled approaching 50 per cent (Pulzer, 1987: 151).

Kohl II (Jan. 1987-Dec. 1990)

The Kohl II cabinet is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). Kohl's coalition was re-elected with a reduced, but still comfortable, majority. The position of the opposition parties prior to this election had been weak. 'Not only did their joint share of the vote (43.8%) hold out little promise of defeating the government at the next election, but they did not constitute an Opposition with a capital O and both [i.e. the SPD and the Greens] were internally divided, not least on the subject of co-operation with each other' (Pulzer, 1987: 149). Still, the Kohl II cabinet was somewhat less strong than its predecessor as the CDU had incurred a loss of 4.5 per cent of the votes (Pulzer, 1991: 145). Almost throughout 1987, the CDU enjoyed a honeymoon period in the opinion polls. During 1988, 1989, and the beginning of 1990, the CDU and the SPD changed these positions variously, with the SPD generally in front. The elections in the *Länder* confirm these results (Pulzer, 1991: 146).

Kohl III (Dec. 1990-Oct. 1994)

The Kohl III cabinet is coded as having a strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .83). As the election of December 2 approached, nearly 90 per cent of the voters expected the CDU to win the elections, which made Kohl basically sure of winning. The FDP pulled the card it had pulled successfully before – the citizens' fear of an absolute CDU majority – and solicited the second (list) votes of those whose first (constituency) vote might go to the CDU. This strategy proved successful, again (Poguntke, 1992: 412). The CDU's response was a last minute poster campaign soliciting both votes (Pulzer, 1991: 151). The election's outcome was a stunning victory for the coalition parties, with 'the opposition parties (...) reduced to further demoralization and disarray' (Pulzer, 1991: 151). The FDP emerged as the major winner. The SPD lost for the third time in a row in the Western zone. Falling below 30 per cent of the popular vote, the party even risked losing its status as a 'catch all' party (Pulzer, 1991: 153). Kohl's CDU did not manage to reap much of the electoral benefits. The party achieved 44.1 per cent of the votes – the lowest share since 1949 (Poguntke, 1992: 412).

Only two months after the election, the new coalition's popularity dropped because of announced tax increases; a proposal that went against the explicit promises made during the election campaign. The cabinet argued that the financial support during the Gulf war had led to unexpected expenses. The voters did not swallow this argument lightly and in the *Land* election in Rhineland-Palatinate the SPD won for the first time in this traditional Christian Democratic stronghold. On June 2, the SPD again gained electorally from the position of the coalition parties as it reaped the majority of seats in the Hamburg *Land* election. After the summer, however, the Christian Democrats gained some ground as the result of – especially – the heated public debate about political asylum (Poguntke, 1992: 414-415). Altogether, 1993 proved a year of scandals and resignations of senior politicians (see Poguntke 1994: 308-10). At the end of this year, '(...) the SPD rose like a phoenix

from the ashes of its arguably most severe leadership crises in postwar history' (Poguntke, 1994: 308).

The year 1994 was a so-called 'super election year' as an unprecedented number of elections were scheduled (Poguntke, 1995: 346ff.). The Lower Saxony *Land* election, held on March 13, provided the first electoral test. The SPD won an overall majority, but the gain had in fact only been .1 per cent of the vote. The Christian Democrats incurred a loss of 5.6 per cent, whereas the Greens gained 2 per cent but ended up in the opposition benches, as the SPD did not need them (Poguntke, 1995: 348). The second election was that of the President. A parliamentary assembly (*Bundesversammlung*), consisting of all members of the Bundestag plus an equal number of delegates who are elected by the individual *Länder* parliaments, conducts this vote. After two rounds, the FDP withdrew its candidate and rallied with the Christian Democrats, who won as a result (Poguntke, 1995: 348). A few weeks later, in the European Parliament (EP) election, the Christian Democrats fared better than expected, whilst the Social Democrats lost over 5 per cent. Consequently, and despite the fact that the FDP had not proven capable of crossing the 5 per cent hurdle, the EP election was regarded a turning point in the run-up to the general election. From May onwards, Kohl was again heading in the popularity polls (Poguntke 1995: 349-50). There were three more *Länder* elections before the *Bundestag* election (Saxony and Brandenburg in Eastern Germany and Bavaria in West Germany). These elections did not affect the political position of the government much: the CDU Prime Minister, Kurt Biedenkopf, won in Saxony; the CSU won the Bavarian election; and the SPD stayed most popular in Brandenburg. In Eastern Germany, both the Liberals and the Greens incurred severe losses (almost all seats) whilst the PDS reaped electoral benefits (Poguntke, 1995: 350).

Kohl IV (Oct. 1994-Sept. 1998)

The Kohl IV cabinet is coded as having a fairly weak Political Position (fuzzy-set score of .33). After the 1994 election, the returning cabinet had only a narrow majority of 10 seats. These seats mainly stemmed from 'surplus mandates', which result when a party's directly won seats exceed the overall number of seats it would be entitled to according to the rules of proportional representation based on the result of the second vote (CDU 12, SPD 4). The large number of surplus mandates for the Christian Democrats may have been due to the successful 'second vote campaign' by the FDP. Still, since the latter had lost (almost) all seats in the 1994 *Länder* elections, the party started with a bitter and hectic internal conflict immediately after the general election (Poguntke, 1995: 350-351).

Before the 1998 Lower Saxony *Land* election, Schröder had stated that he would only consider himself a suitable Chancellor-candidate if he would win the election with a certain margin. He indeed won convincingly, which induced his competitor, Lafontaine, to declare his support to Schröder (Poguntke, 1999: 401) and boosted substantially the Social Democrats in the opinion polls. The Greens, who had done well until 1997 (around 10% of the votes in the polls, which is about twice their usual support) announced a drastic increase in petrol prices in their manifesto. As a result, they had to fight hard to return from the 5 per cent they polled in April 1998.

Schröder I (Sept. 1998-Sept. 2002)

The cabinet Schröder I is coded as having a fairly strong Political Position (fuzzy-set score .67). The incumbent government had been seriously defeated in the 1998 election and the election outcome represented a clear mandate for a Red-Green coalition. The election results also made possible a Red-Blue (SPD/FDP) coalition, but the FDP was unwilling to accommodate itself to the Social Democrats. The Christian Democrats, who could have formed a Grand Coalition with the SPD, preferred the opposition benches after having lost 6 per cent of the popular vote. The new Red-Green coalition was formed rapidly. To the surprise of many, the Greens behaved professionally and disciplined, whilst the Social Democrats ranks showed considerable turmoil (especially about who should get which position). Party chairman Lafontaine was the 'bad guy' in much of this (see Poguntke, 1999: 400).

Two conflicts marked the first months of Schröder I. First, Schröder was reluctant to consider much the Green priorities like dual citizenship and nuclear energy policy. Second, within the SPD itself, there was a permanent power struggle between the left-wing traditionalists, led by Lafontaine, and economic modernizers, led by Schröder. Lafontaine's sudden resignation from all offices and his escape from public life solved the latter conflict. In April 1999, Hans Eichel, newly ousted former Hesse Prime Minister, took over as Minister of Finance and Schröder himself became party leader. To re-adjust his party position further, Schröder published a joint declaration with Blair. In this document, the two called for supply-side oriented left-wing policies, a stance that was severely criticized by the unions and the SPD traditionalists (Poguntke, 2000: 393). In all *Länder* elections in 1999, the Greens lost substantially – perhaps because of Germany's forces first military confrontation since WW II (Yugoslavia). Also the SPD generally lost in the *Länder* elections. Both parties ended up on the losing side of the EP elections too, whereby the Greens were hit hardest (Poguntke, 2000: 393-394).

However, in November 1999, a major scandal over illegal party finance, corruption charges and so-called 'black' Swiss bank accounts, paralyzed the Christian Democrats and amounted to the worst crisis in the party's history and the resignation of Kohl. The coalition, and especially Schröder, benefited from the CDU's misery (Poguntke, 2000: 394).

Hence, a year before the election, most observers expected the Red-Green coalition to win the 2002 election by a substantial margin. Things turned for the better for the Christian Democrats when CDU leader Edmund Stoiber announced to run for Chancellor early 2002. In March 2002, the SPD entered a party finance and corruption scandal. Probably more damaging was that the unemployment figures reached a four-year high in June. Furthermore, the economic competence of Schröder was questioned when a major building company, which Schröder had helped to rescue with state subsidies, collapsed (Poguntke, 2003: 957; see also Helms, 2004: 144-145).

Appendix D References

- Adserà, A. and Boix, C. (2002) 'Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness', *International Organization* 56 (2): 229-262.
- Alesina, A. and Drazen, A. (1991) 'Why are Stabilizations Delayed?', *The American Economic Review* 81 (5): 1170-1188.
- Alesina, A., Ardagna, S. and Trebbi, F. (2006) 'Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms', *IMF Staff Papers* 53: 1-29.
- Armingeon, K., Gerber, M., Leimgruber, P. and Beyeler, M. (2008) *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2006*. Institute of Political Science: University of Berne.
- Bartle, J. (2003) 'The General Election in Britain, June 2001', *Electoral Studies* 22 (1): 166-173.
- Béland, D. (2005) Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutional Perspective. *Social Policy & Administration*, 39(1), 1-18.
- Berrington, H. (1983) 'The British General Election of 1983', *Electoral Studies* 2 (3): 263-285.
- Bille, L. (1992) 'Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research* 22 (4): 387-390.
- Bille, L. (1994) 'Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research* 26 (3-4): 279-287.
- Bille, L. (1995) 'Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research* 28 (3-4): 313-321.
- Bille, L. (1999) 'Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research* 36 (3-4): 371-381.
- Bille, L. (2000) 'Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research* 38 (3-4): 366-373.
- Bille, L. (2002) 'Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (7-8): 941-946.
- Blyth, M. (2002) *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press.
- Borre, O. (1984) 'The Danish Parliamentary Election of 10 January 1984', *Electoral Studies* 3 (2): 190-210.
- Borre, O. (1991) 'The Danish General Election of 1990', *Electoral Studies* 10 (2): 133-138.
- Bowman, E.H. (1980) 'A Risk/Return Paradox for Strategic Management', *Sloan Management Review* 21 (3): 17-31.
- Bridges, A. (2000) 'Path Dependence, Sequence, History, Theory', *Studies in American Political Development* 14 (1): 109-112.
- Burgoon, B. (2001) 'Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties that Bind', *International Organization* 55 (3): 509-551.
- Cameron, D.R. (1978) 'The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis', *American Political Science Review* 72 (4): 1243-1261.
- Cozens, P. and Swaddle, K. (1987) 'The British General Election of 1987', *Electoral Studies* 6 (3): 263-288.
- Cuckierman, A. and Tommasi, M. (1998) 'When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China?', *The American Economic Review* 88 (1): 180-197.
- Drazen, A. and Grilli, V. (1993) 'The Benefits of Crises for Economic Reforms', *The American Economic Review* 83 (3): 598-607.
- Drazen, A. and Easterly, W. (2001) 'Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom', *Economics & Politics* 13 (2): 129-157.
- Elklit, J. (1999) 'The Danish March 1998 Parliamentary Election', *Electoral Studies* 18 (1):

- 117-147.
- Fernandez, R. and Rodrik, D. (1991) 'Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty', *American Economic Review* 81 (5): 1146-1155.
- Fiegenbaum, A. and Thomas, H. (1988) 'Attitudes toward Risk and the Risk-Return Paradox: Prospect Theory Explanations', *Academy of Management Journal* 31 (1): 85-106.
- Fisher, J. (2002) 'United Kingdom', *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (7-8): 1101-1110.
- Fisher, J. (2003) 'United Kingdom', *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (7-8): 1108-1114.
- Fisher, S. and Smith, S. (2005) 'United Kingdom', *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (7-8): 1211-1220.
- Fleckenstein, T. (2008) Restructuring welfare for the unemployed: the Hartz legislation in Germany', *Journal of European Social Policy* 18 (2): 177-188.
- Fuhrmann, M. and Early, B.R. (2008) 'Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4 (1): 21-43.
- Garrett, G. (1998) *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Garrett, G. and Mitchell, D. (2001) 'Globalization, Government Spending and Taxation in the OECD', *European Journal of Political Research* 39 (2): 145-177.
- Gaston, N. and Rajaguru, G. (2008). 'The Rise (and Fall) of Labour Market Programmes: Domestic vs. Global Factors', *Oxford Economic Papers* 60 (4): 619-648.
- Green-Pedersen, C. (2002) *The Politics of Justification: Party Competition and Welfare-State Retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Ha, E. (2008) 'Globalization, veto Players, and Welfare Spending', *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (6): 783-813.
- Hall, P.A. (1993) 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain', *Comparative Politics* 25 (3): 275-296.
- Helms, L. (2004) 'The Federal Election in Germany, September 2002', *Electoral Studies* 23 (1): 143-182.
- Hsieh, C. (2000) 'Bargaining over Reform', *European Economic Review* 44 (9): 1659-1676.
- Huber, E. and Stephens, J.D. (2006) 'Combating Old and New Social Risks', in K. Armington and G. Bonoli (eds), *The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States: Adapting Post-War Social Policies to New Social Risks*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Irwin, G.A. (1983) 'The Dutch Parliamentary Election of 1982', *Electoral Studies* 2 (1): 69-83.
- Irwin, G.A. (1995) 'The Dutch Parliamentary Election of 1994', *Electoral Studies* 14 (1): 72-7.
- Irwin, G.A. (1999) 'The Dutch Parliamentary Election of 1998', *Electoral Studies* 18 (2): 271-300.
- Irwin, G.A. and Holsteyn, J.J.M. (2004) 'The 2002 and 2003 Parliamentary Elections in The Netherlands', *Electoral Studies* 23 (3): 545-571.
- Iversen, T. and Cusack, T.R. (2000) 'The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?', *World Politics* 52 (April): 313-349.
- Jervis, R. (2000) 'Timing and Interaction in Politics: A Comment on Pierson', *Studies in American Political Development* 14 (1): 93-100.
- Kaase, M. (1983) 'The West German General Election of 6 March 1983', *Electoral Studies* 2

- (2) 158-166.
- Kapstein, E. (1996) 'Workers in the World Economy', *Foreign Affairs* 75 (3): 16-37.
- Katzenstein, P.J. (1985) *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keman, H. Van Kersbergen, K. and Vis, B. (2006) 'Political Parties and New Social Risks: The Double Backlash against Social Democracy and Christian Democracy', in: K. Armingeon and G. Bonoli (eds), *The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States: Adapting Post-War Social Policies to New Social Risks*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Kitschelt, H., Lange, P., Marks, G. and Stephens, J.D. (eds) (1999) *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (2001) 'Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?', in P. Pierson (ed) *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Koster, F. (2007) 'Bedreigt Economische Openheid de Verzorgingsstaat, of Niet? Een Synthese van Internationaal Vergelijkend Onderzoek', *Beleid & Maatschappij* 34 (3): 143-154.
- Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (1998) 'The Netherlands', *European Journal of Political Research* 34 (3-4): 471-473.
- Mackie, T.T. (1992) 'United Kingdom', *European Journal of Political Research* 22 (4): 537-542.
- Mackie, T.T. (1994) 'United Kingdom', *European Journal of Political Research* 26 (3-4): 445-450.
- Mackie, T.T. (1995) 'United Kingdom', *European Journal of Political Research* 28 (3-4): 495-503.
- McDermott, R. (1998) *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Mosley, L. (2003) *Global Capital and National Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006). *Economic Outlook*. Paris: OECD.
- Pierson, P. (2000a) 'Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes', *Studies in American Political Development* 14 (1): 72-92.
- Pierson, P. (2000b) 'Dr. Seuss and Dr. Stinchcombe: A Reply to the Commentaries', *Studies in American Political Development* 14 (1): 113-119.
- Pierson, P. (2004) *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Poguntke, T. (1992) 'Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 22 (4): 409-416.
- Poguntke, T. (1994) 'Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 26 (3-4): 305-312.
- Poguntke, T. (1995) 'Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 28 (3-4): 341-352.
- Poguntke, T. (1999) 'Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 36 (3-4): 395-404.
- Poguntke, T. (2000) 'Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 38 (3-4): 390-396.
- Poguntke, T. (2003) 'Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (7-8): 957-963.
- Poguntke, T. (2005) 'Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (7-8): 1019-1024.
- Pulzer, P. (1987) 'The West German Federal Election of 25 January 1987', *Electoral Studies* 6 (2): 149-178.
- Pulzer, P. (1991) 'The German Federal Election of 1990', *Electoral Studies* 10 (2): 145-154.

- Ragin, C.C. (2008) *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rodrik, D. (1997) *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- Rodrik, D. (1998) 'Why do More Open Economies have Bigger Governments?', *Journal of Political Economy* 106 (5): 997-1032.
- Schmidt, V.A. (2002) 'Does Discourse Matter in the Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?', *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2): 168-193.
- Spolaore, E. (2004) 'Adjustments in Different Government Systems', *Economics & Politics* 16 (2): 117-146.
- Stiller, S. (2007) *Innovative Agents versus Immovable Objects: The Role of Ideational Leadership in German Welfare State Reforms*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen.
- Strange, S. (1996) *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Swank, D. (2002) *Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. (ed.) (2005) *Ideas and Welfare State Reform in Western Europe*. Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thelen, K. (2000) 'Timing and Temporality in the Analysis of Institutional Evolution and Change', *Studies in American Political Development* 14 (1): 101-108.
- Thomsen, S.R. (1995) 'The 1994 Parliamentary Election in Denmark', *Electoral Studies* 14 (3): 315-322.
- Van der Eijk, C., Irwin, G. and Niemöller, K. (1986) 'The Dutch Parliamentary Election of May 1986', *Electoral Studies* 5 (3): 289-296.
- Visser, J., and Hemerijck, A. (1997) *A Dutch Miracle: Job Growth, Welfare Reform, and Corporatism in the Netherlands*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Webb, P. (1997) 'United Kingdom', *European Journal of Political Research* 32 (3-4): 509-516.
- Webb, P. (2000) 'United Kingdom', *European Journal of Political Research* 38 (3-4): 542-551.
- Weyland, K. (2002) *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela*. Princeton and New York: Princeton University Press.
- Woldendorp, J., Keman, H. and Budge, I. (2000) *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998): Composition, Duration, Personnel*. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Wood, S. (1999) 'The British General Election of 1997', *Electoral Studies* 18 (1): 117-147.